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THE DIFFERENT VOICES OF
SARTRE'S ETHICS
Within twentieth century philosophy and psychology, Sartre's existentialist
analysis of consciousness and the self holds one of the most radical positions.
Central to this analysis was an emphasis on the absolute freedom of
consciousness to determine its own meaning. To some, this position of
henneneutical omnipotence amounted to a French expansion of the philosophy
of Humpty Dumpty, since Sartre certainly gave the impression that all one's
thoughts and actions can mean anything one wants them to. When Alice
questioned Humpty Dumpty about the way he had used a certain word, he
explained to ber that it's simply a matter of showing a word who's boss. I Many
of Sartre's early critics questioned the possibility of ever grounding an ethical
theory in a position that granted such unlimited power to consciousness. Indeed,
Sartre was never quite able to deliver the projected work on ethics that he had
promised in Being and Nothingness.
Sartre originally based his existentialist view of 'tbe self on the rejection
of the reality of "human nature." He denied that the self has any intrinsie
essence from which actions, feelings, or thoughts might emanate. Rather he saw
tbat the qualities associated with the self were a result of reflective acts of
consciousness that could be endlessly modified with the passage of time. In other
words, there can be no fixed or substantial ego because the freedom of
consciousness to revise and reinterpret itself means that self-reflection is
synonymous with self-ereation.
It is not surprising to find that a philosophical position that rejects a
substantive core to the self would also reject any ethical system based on pre-
existing mies or codified norms for behavior. The existential anguish that
accompanies one's realization of the endless possibilities open to human
I Lewis Carroll, 7he AnnOlaled Alice (New York: Forum Books, 1960), p. 269.
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consciousness is linked to an ethical anguish as weil, since ethical values are
also endlessly revised in the exercise of one's own freedom. 2
Recent discussions of moral development stimulated by the findings of
Carol Gilligan and others have pointed to differing styles of ethical decision-
making that reflect different forms of self-eonsciousness.3 Gilligan's work
suggests that when aUlonomy is elevated as the selrs central characteristic,
moral judgment tends to emphasize the importance of protecting the self from
intrusions and violations by others, Le., the essence of the so-called "justice"
perspective, wbich focuses on principles of duty and respect for individual
rights. Conversely, when the self is experienced in fundamentally relalional
terms-assumed by many psychologists to be more characteristic of female
identity-,' an ethics of "care" that aims at preserving relationship with others
is more common. Here the concern is less one of preserving another person's
rights than it is of rescuing her or him from feelings of isolation and
abandonment.
Certainly, it is fair to say that Sartre's notion of consciousness places a
higher premium on autonomy than relation. Indeed, Being anti NOlhingness
portrayed conflict and hostility as the underlying ontological reality of
relationship with the Other, and a line in No Exil described other people as
"hell." Sartre presented the frightening potential of "the look of the Other" to
objectify one's own existence and thereby compromise one's freedom through
a kind of ontological rape.
Some critics have linked Sartre's assumption of such perpetual struggle
between self and other, and of the apparent incompatibility of freedom and
2A vulgarization of this model of consciousness and its ethical conaequences aurvives in an
ideology of ethical freedom within certain ao-called "New Ale" or human lrowth movemen18. The
·vullar exiSlentialism" of luch movementa asserta not only that ODe choosel every circumstance and
characteriltic ofone'llife, but allO that lood and evilare totally relative. Sartre himselfwould never
have endorsed such a position.
JCarol Gillilan, In a Differen. Voice (Caanbridge: Harvard Univeraity Press, 1982).
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relatedness, to a fundamentally masculine view of the self.4 The male self, it
has been suggested by psychoanalytically informed interpreters like Nancy
Chodorow, defines itself in opposition to others, and remains locked with them
in a battle for autonomy. 5 It is no wonder, therefore, that morality becomes for
the early Sartre an area of individual self-determination measured by one's
relationship to oneself, not others. Authenticity lies in the lonely acceptance of
the anguish of freedom. Is it then troe that the existentialist ethic of authenticity
is incompatible with a "relational" ethics of care and compassionit
To be sure, among Sartre's first descriptions of the "look of the Other" is
an emphasis on the sense of violation and loss of control produced by ,the
Other's look and the challenge it presents to the freedom of an individual's
consciousness. Whether one encounters the Other in a contest ofconsciousnesses
or in the tender caresses of care, however, Sartre's early writings insisted on a
specific technical point: Any relationship with another person-whatever its
quality-modifies the world that person inhabiJs. Even the most benign and
loving relationship places the Other in a world he or she did not create.
4Cf. Linda Singer, "Interpretation and Retrieval: Rereading Beauvoir," Women's Sludies Inl.
Fonun, 1985, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 231-238. Singer's critique of Sal1re only concems the position of
Being and Nothingness and tends to overdramatize the differences between Sal1re and Beauvoir at
that time.
SNancy Chodorow, 11Ie Reproduclion 0/ Motherlng (Berkeley: University of Califomia Press,
1978).
~el Noddings argues that the existentialist assumption of the freedom of conseiousness as the
primary datum of human existenee makes aloneness and anguish inevitable, while a view of identity
rooted in relation sees joy as the fundamental human response to the world. She sees in Sartre a
rejeetion of the fundamental 'relatedness of human beings. Nel Noddings, Carlng: A Feminine
Approach '0 Elhics antI Moral Educalion (Berkeley: University ofCalifomia Press, 1984), p. 6. Cf.
p.51:
.. As I ehop away at the ehains that bind me to love othen, asserting my freedom, I move into
a wildemess of strangers and loneline8., leaving behind all who eared for me and even,
perbaps, my own self. I am not naturally alone. I am naturally in a relation from which I
derive nourishment and guidanee. When I am alone, either beeause I have detaehed myself
or beeause eircumstances have wrenehed me free, I &eek first and more naturally to
reestablish my relatedness. My very individuality is defined in a set of relations. This is my
basie reality."
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From the moment that 1 exist 1 establish a factuallimit to the Other'. freedom. I am
this limit, and each of my projecla traces the outJine of this limit around the Other.
Charity, laisser-faire, tolerance-evenan attitude ofabatcntion-are each one a project
of myself which en,a,e. me and which en,a,ea the Other in hia acquieacence. To
realae tolerance with reapect to Ibe Other il to caulC Ibe Other to be thrown
forcefully into a tolerant world. It ia to rcmove from him on principle those free
poslibilitiea of coura,eoua resistance, of pencverance, of aclf-alacrtion which he
would have had the opportunity to develop in a world of intolerance.... Thus
respect for the Olber'. frcedom i. an empty word; even if we could a••ume Ibe
project of respecting Ibia frcedom, each attitude which we adopted wilb re.pectto Ibe
Other wouldbe a violation of that frcedom which we claimed to re.pect.'
From tbis point of view, even an attitude of care represents a field for the
Other's freedom wbich simultaneously opens and closes the range of ~ssibilities
available. 8 Thus a mother's conscientious care of her baby removes the child's
possibility to overcome the pain of neglect and abuse. Whether anyone would
advocate preserving such a possibility or preferring it to another is l10t the point.
Many years later, Sartre observed the central importance of a mother's love for
her child in developing the child's identity.
. . . by thi. love and through it, through the very person of the mother-akillful or
clumsy, brutal or tender, auch aa her hiatory ha. made her-Ibe child is made
manifest to himaelf.... He will know hia bodily parts, violent, gentle, beaten,
constrained, or free through the violence or gentlenesa of the hands that awaken
them ... it ia the totalaituation Ibat ia deciaive .ince it ia Ihe whole molher who ia
projected in the Oesh of her flesh.9
The underlying idea here is that the other people's actions condition both one's
freedom and identity no matter what those aetions are.
7Being and Nolhingness (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), p. 409.
80ne possible explanation of the difference between the Jewiah sage Hillel'a fonnulation of the
Golden Rule, "Do nOI do unto othera al you would nol have thern do unto you,· and Jeaua' ~Do
unto others as you would have them do unto you,· ia that Hillel'a version reflecls an understanding
that overzealous care rnust also be checked.
97Jae Family Idiot (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 47.
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And yet Sartre's original metaphor may raise some doubts in the minds of
bis critics. To call charity and tolerance something that "forcefully throws" the
Other into a world he or she didn't ask for, suggests that our violations of each
other's autonomy form the primordial strocture of interpersonal relations. Only
later in bis life did Sartre begin to regard the original relation to the other as a
positive rather than threatening force in constituting the self.
Furthermore, there are other characterizations ofthe Other's "look" within
Sartre's work and other ethical dimensions that are associated with them. Thus,
as Sartre became more aware of various forms of political and social oppression,
he described a more contextualized "look. " 10e "look" of the oppressed Other,
for example, is a look of protest linked to an ethic of liberation. 1Ous, the
colonized peoples of Africa were the ones whose perceptions unveiled the evil
of European exploitation. In the final period of bis Iife, moreover, Sartre gained
an appreciation of the parent-ehild relation inthe formation of identity. Here he
described the look of the Other as one of affirmation and love,the basis on
which one can begin to develop an ethics of care.
It would be wrong, however, to argue for the primacy of any of these
positions within Sartre's work or to suggest a hierarchical ordering of them in
bis mind. The troe evolution of Sartre's ethical thought lies in his growing
appreciation of the intersecting ethical dimensions that infonn our diverse
interactions with others.
Psychologists such as Kohlberg and Gilligan have tended to pose ethical
dilemmas to subjects as a means for studying their styles of ethical decisions. In
his famous address "Existentialism is a Humanism," Sartre also described an
ethical dilemma brought to him by a former student during World War II. The
young man's mother was deeply troubled both by her husband's collaboration
with the Nazis and by the death of her older son during the Nazi invasion. The
young man knew that he was his mother's sole consolation and that she would
be devastated if anythin'g happened to him. And yet he was tom by his desire
to leave his mother in order to fmd the French Free forces and join their fight
against the Nazis. As Sartre described it, the young man
. . . found himself confronted by two very different model of action; the one
concrele, immediate, but direcled toward only one individual; and the other an action
addressed lo an end infinitely greater, anational collectivity, but for that very reason
ambiguous-and it might be fNstrated on the way. At the same time, he was
hesilating between two kinds of morality; on the one side, the morality of sympathy,
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of persona' devotion, and, on &he o&her aide, a morality of wider scope but of more
debatable validity. He had 10 choosc between &hose two. IO
The two forms of morality Sartre refers to here do not correspond precisely to
the notions of "care" moralityand "justice" morality, though it would be easy
to suppose that staying horne to attend to one's mother would certainly come
closer to Gilligan's focus on care for and attention to personal relations. It has
Iittle to do with the rights or freedom of the Other. On the other hand, going off
to fight the Nazis would not only be closer to the justice perspective with its
concern for duty and freedom, but would probably also be the more appealing
option to an autonomous masculine self raised on the importance of values such
as honor and vengeance. .
ODe of Gilligan's colleagues actually posed Sartre's dilemma to a number
of high school students. ODe female student responded as folIows:
If I werc &he boy, I &hink &hat I would have chosen to ltay with Ihe moIher. I do not
know if that would be beat, but it i. a morc inuncdiatc aod aoOO IOlulion. Are therc
no other men to be loyal to the alale, when he ia the only one whom hia mother'a
existence dependa on? I feet atrongly lOward dircctin, actiona 10ward the good of
individuals. If everyone did so, 10gicaUy, theae actions would be for the good of
evcryone. 11
According to Gilligan and Wiggins, this response is an example of the ethic of
care, since it responds to the immediate need of the mother. It also implies that
if such caring relationships were more universally practiced, then tbis individual
act would also serve the common good. Hy looking at the situation in this way
the respondent avoids "tuming moral dilemmas into binary choice, win-Iose
situations... 12
IOWExislentialism ia a Humanism, Win üiSlenlialism fron. Dosloevsky 10 Sarlre (Cleveland:
Meridian Books, 1969), pp. 295-6.
llCarot Oilliaan and Orant Wiggins, wThe Origina of Morality in Earty Childhood




But is the response of Gilligan and Wiggin's subject really a superior
response? Sartre certainly would have respected the inventiveness of the reasons
she provides for her choice. After all, Sartre's own response to his student was
"You are free, therefore choose,-that is to say, invent." Yet it is also true that
her response makes little reference to the importance of devoting oneself to the
fight against oppression that the student might also choose. In the aftermath of
the ·war, Sartre realized that ethical discussion cannot take place outside the
context of the present social arrangement of society or without consideration of
the forms of oppression within that society. For Sartre, the care of individuals
is ultimately futile if it leaves the fundamental structure of society unexamined.
He says,
Such is the present paradox of ethics; if I am absorbed in treatin, a few chosen
persona as absolute enda, for example, my wife, my son, my friend., the needy
person I happen 10 come across, if I am bent upon fulfilling an my duties toward
them, I sball spend my life doing so; I sball be led to pass over in silence the
injustices of the age, the clas. stnlggle, colonialism, Anti-semitism, etc. and finally,
to tau advanlage oJ oppression in order 10 do good. . . . The good that I try to do
will be vitiated at the rooll.... But vice versa, if I throw myself into the
revolutionary enterprise, I risle having no more leisure for personal relations-worse
still, of being led by the logic of action into treating mOlt men, and even my friends,
as means. 13
Clearly, what Sartre saw as the critical factor in ethical discussion was fmding
some way of describing the dialectical interaction of multiple ethical
perspectives. To return tothe student's dilemma, Sartre suggests that whatever
the student decides for himself, the moral struggle of humanity must include a
multi-Ieveled response. Some people will consume all their ethical energy in
interpersonal relationships, while others are dedicated to structural social
change. Ultimately, one ~ust accept not only that each pole remains in perpetual
tension with the other but also that in some way each implies the other. 14
Perhaps, Sartre is being overly dualistic in his analysis to make a point.
Surely t there is no reasoD why ODe could not simultaneously maintain humane
relationships while also pursuing larger goals of social change. But the
13Whal ;s Lileralure? (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 268-9.
14ib;d.
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underlying point remains. Tbe student who attends only to the needs of his
mother is foreed to look aside from the war heing waged by the Nazis, all the
while that bis own father co11aborates with this degrading of democratic values.
In truth, Gilligan and Wiggin's respondent did not really offer a "win-win"
response either. Sartre implies that in the name of an ethic of personal care,
one's perspective ironically may he too individualistic, and in the aet of
preserving individual relations, one may become blind to large scale injustice.
By not being part of the solution to oppression, one becomes part of the
problem.
In short, both of the student's choices were reasonable possibilities that
reflected a clear appraisal of the situation and the needs it presented. There is
no single righl thing to do. Sartre denied that either one of these choices was
better than the other. Rather, he simply accepted the uncomfortable fact that in
ethical matters fulfilling one kind of responsibility may require neglecting
another. There is no cheap resolution of the problem. ODe must have the
courage to face one's life, and to assume responsibility for one's situation by
accepting it as the field against which one is free to create an ethical response.
This idea does not imply that any action whatsoever is acceptable, but only that
the values of care on the interpersonal level and struggle for justice on the
societal level cannot be arranged hierarchically.
Although Gilligan has sometimes given the impression that the female
ethical "voice" of the care perspective is preferable to the justice perspective,
she has usually tried to be considerably more circumspect about what constitutes
the "better" response to such ethical dilemmas. She insists that what is important
about the female ethical "voice" is not its superiority, but its ability to perceive
and preserve the ethical ambiguity of the dilemma. Wben only one moral voice
is heard, moral problems may seem to have "right" answers. Por Gilligan, the
acceptance of moral ambiguity is characteristie of what she calls "moral
maturity, ,,15 an idea that comes elose to Sartre's ideal of "authenticity."
Sartre, too, insisted that in exercising ethical choice one must remain aware of
the underlying ambiguity, and that one must hear the call of different etbical
voices-regardless of whether one's social situation or gender has sensitized one
to a particular set of moral concems Iike oppression vs equality Uustice], or
indifference vs responsiveness [care]. For Sartre, one's ethics will always reflect
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a "fundamental project" which has been coloretl by childhood experience,
gender, race, ethnicity, class, etc. 16 Sartre was weil aware of Gilligan's
general point that ethical style may be a function of identity development,
although 'the specific ways in which his ethics might have been conditioned by
bis own gender identity was not an issue tbat be really bad ever considered.
The anguisb of ethical choice sterns from the fact that ethics for Sartre are
simultaneously "inevitable" and "indispensable, " and yet ultimately
"impossible." 17 Not only is it impossible to establisb fixed principles that
would enable us to decide between competing ethical demands, but we must also
recognize that the decisions we do ultimately make, may be thrown into doubt
by future moments in history. lust as the self is itself always subject to revision
by further acts of consciousness at any moment in the future, the "look" of the
future casts its shadow back to undermine any fixed values we claim today.
We feel ahat we are beingjudged by ahe masked men who will sueeeed us and whose
knowledge of all things will be such ahat we eannot have the slightest inkling of what
it will be; our age will be an objeet for those future eyes whose gaze haunls uso And
a guilty objeet. They will reveal to U8 our faHure and guilt. Our age, whieh i. already
dead, already I thing, though we still have to live it, is alone in history, and this
historieal solitude detennines even our perceptions: what we see will no longer be;
people will laugh at our ignorance, will be indignant at our mistakes. 18
Sartre saw fixed or ready-made values as the foundation of oppression.
They were the tools used by antisemites, racists, and colonialists to avoid
looking at their own freedom and to justify their treatment of the less
powerful. 19 Oppressors always see oppression as justified by certain natural
facts about the world. Sartre feit that too much of what passes for morality is
merely an intemalization of the roles and attitudes of a particular society at a
particular moment in history. Those who experience a certain natural legitimacy
16Cf. Searchfor a Melhod (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 110.
11Sainl GeneI: AClor and Martyr, translaled by Bemard Freehtman (New York: New Ameriean
Library, 1963). pp. 186, 224.
18Sainl GeneI, pp. 596-7.
19Cf. Simone de Beauvoir, 1he Ethics 0/Ambiguiry (Seeaueus: Citadel Press, 1975), p. 44.
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to their identities, tend to develop an ethics of "Iegitimate" rights that must be
protected.
In the moral dilemma used by both Kohiberg and Gilligan to analyze moral
development, one is asked how "Heinz" should respond when he realizes he
cannot afford to pay the price a druggist is asking for a drug that will cure bis
wife's cancer. For Sartre, to respond to tbis dilemma would mean to investigate
the social constructions that make medicine belong to the druggist and that
thereby define tbe crime of stealing. In bis discussion of Genet, Sartre sees theft
as a product of a social construction that presupposes adefinition of society, a
property system, a legal code, and a particular kind of ethics.20 In analyzing
Jean Genet's social position as a thief, Sartre raises the question of the ways in
which the sense of entitlement of well-to-do members 'of society that creates
Genet as a criminal merely constitutes a form of bad faith itself.
In contrast, ethical authenticity requires recognizing the permanent
instability of human reality and tbe continual struggle for extending liberation
to all people. It enables one to pierce a passive acceptance of the given structure
of society in order to perceive the underlying structures of oppression and
inequity within it. Genuine caring human relations are only possible, therefore,
in the context of simultaneous social change. While Gilligan emphasizes the
importance of rediscovering women's moral voice, Sartre highlighted the
distortions of the voice of those in power, Le., a voice of inertia and
legitimization. It is in the voice of the marginalized and oppressed Other that
Sartre hears a voicethat contests and transcends oppression. Thus, in their own
ways Gilligan and Sartre are eacb trying to give ethical voice to the silenced.
Just as Carol Gilligan has recently shown that in a society that assigns
certain roles to rnen and wornen, gender will affect moral decisions, Sartre
emphasized that ethical authenticity is Iikewise determined by one's place in
society. The first step of ethical analysis is the realization of the ethical
significance of one's position vis avis tbe others in the world.21 Morality,
'1DSainl GeneI, p. 39.
211n Being and No'hingness, translated by Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophieal Library,
1956), the moral implieations of the existence of the Other are already implicit in Sartre's analysis:
I am situated also a. a European in relation to Asians, or to Negroes, as an old man in
relation to the young, as a judge in relation to delinquents, as a bourgeois in relation to
workers, ete. In short it is in relation to every living Inan that every Iiving human reality is
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therefore, requires a decentering of those in power and a redefinition of the
meaning of othemess. In a certain sense, Sartre feit the need to "alter" himself
in order to speak critically about oppression. As writer, he had to identify
himself with the marginalized perspective of women, Jews, homosexuals,
blacks, workers, etc. which collectively symbolized the transcendent power of
Othemess. This "eccentric" perspective one experiences from the margin is
critical if one is ever to question the tempting stable self offered by society.
It is troe that Sartre's ethics began from a position of individualism that
saw the Other as threatening rather than embracing [what he later called "the
ethics of I"]. In Being anti Nothingness, the "look of the Other" performs a
perpetual decentering of the stability of the autonomous self. Although it would
be easy to attribute this rather bleak view of human relations to the special bias
and sensitivity of male identity development, which sees the Other only as a
challenge to one's own autonomy, the "look" takes on a very different quality
when the social situation is factored in.
Understood within its social context, the look of the Other performs a
moral decentering as weil as an ontological one. A "look" grounded in
authenticity is one that identi fies the oppression of racism, colonialism,
antisemitism, and sexism. The "look" of the oppressed Other shows me how I
may know myself as oppressor. This look reveals to the powerful that their own'
social position or power is accidental rather than justified or legitimate. From
this point of view, Sartre suggested that white male bourgeois Christians must
begin to feel fear or shame from the "look of the Other, " especially if the Other
is a victim of his own undeserved inherited power. One finds frequent allusions
in Sartre's work to the clearer vision of the marginal Other whose perspective
provides an ethical indictment of those in power. For the group in power,
however, authenticity requires both acknowledging and questioning the
inauthenticity that grants privileges for some people but simultaneously oppresses
others. Unfortunately, the "respectable" inembers of society often can see inthe
rejected and negated members of society only their own rejected and negated
choices, the dark side of their own personalities. Sartre wondered, "how can I
reasonably think that a member of society's elite would be able to lower
himself-if it can be called lowering himself-to the level of the oppressed and
present or absent on the ground of an original presence.... The Other is present to me
everywhere as the one through wholn I become an object. (p. 279)
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exploited people and to consider w;th the eyes 0/ the people, the crushing
pedestals on which the bourgeois hierarchy sits? ..22 Gender, race, class are
accidents of birth, but to deny the social impact and benefit of these accidents
is a sign of inauthenticity.
Sartre was right to see the challenge offered to my own moral perspective
from the Other who presents a viewpoint that I cannot have myself. Indeed, this
is the lesson of Gilligan's call to hear other ethical voices and to acknowledge
other ethical ways of "looking... The conflictual element io Sartre's model of
relatiooship was related at least in part to bis concern about the oppression of
certain groups in society.
Therefore, it is 00 accident that one observes in Sartre's work the gradual
emergence of the marginalized Other-Jews, homosexUaIs, blacks and, to a
lesser extent, womeo-as the loci of authenticity.23 They are the critical
extemal point ofview that reveals a society's ethical being-for-its-Others. Sartre
realized that bis model of existential freedom and autonomy would become a
humanism of bad faith if it did not take ioto account the power and privilege that
diminishes members of some groups as Other. He rejected the notion of
universal humanistic ethics based on some abstract democratic principle of
seeing all people as just human beings. Rather, he favored a "concrete
liberalism" that would consider all citizens concretely in their situation as Jews,
blacks, women, etc. with individual needs as such.24 Even when it was
possible, Sartre opposed the assimilation of the minority into the majority's ideas
and values, since assimilation would mean the collapse of authenticity by
becoming identified with the "I" of the majority. The ethical integrity of the
Other is linked to the role of othemess as a "category of challenge"2S that
22UjeISiluations, translated by Paul Auster and Lydia Davis (New York: Random House,
Pantheon Books, 1977), p. 178.
231 have analyzed abis issue in sOlne depab in Vulgarily anti Authentieily (Amherst: University
of Massachusetts Press, 1991).
24Anlisemile and lew (New York: Schocken Books, 1965), p. 146.
25Cf. Sandra Harding, "The Curious Coincidence of Feminine and African Moralities,· in Eva
F. Kittay and Diana T. Meyers, eds., Women and Moral1heory (fotowa: Rowman & Liulefield,
1987), pp. 296-315.
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undermines accepted values and ideologies. Sartre's rejection of the universalism
of the democrat anticipated Gilligan's concem that traditional ethics of justice
tend to subsume the particular other into the universalized generalized other.26
Sartre denied that abstract principles of morality could be applied to dilemmas
like that of bis student. "The content is always concrete and therefore
unpredictable; it has always to be invented. The one thing that counts is to know
whether the invention is made in the name of freedom. "27
The qualities that Sartre idealized among the inhabitants of the margin
were the ones he thought necessary for a new form of social existence. The
spontaneity, sensitivity, vitality , etc. that drew him to Jews, women, and other
outsiders needed to be developed in all people. Only then would the Other cease
to be threateninf and become capable of being encountered in a spirit of
"transparency."2 This ethical model of transparency focuses on the quality of
the interpersonal relationship, not merely respect for each other's autonomy or
"rights." The goal for the future is to repair the quality of relationship, not
institute some abstract system ofjustice. As Hazel Bames has pointed out, Sartre
eventually developed a view of the Other's look that was not based on conflict
and hostility. First there is the "look of transparency" wherein we see one
another without distortion or secrets, with the openness of the mother's look at
her baby. And out of this look it is possible to begin to look at the world
together as a we. 29
26C f. Seyla Benhabib, "The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan
Controversy and Moral Theory," in ibid., pp. 154-177.
27" Exislenlialism is a Hu~ni8m," p. 308.
21". think thai whal spoHs relations alnong people is that each keeps 80mething hidden from the
other, solnething secret. ... I think transparency should always be 8ubstituted ror what is secrecy.
I can imagine the day when lWo men will no longer have secrets from each odler. because no one
will have any more secrets from anyone. because subjective Iife. aB weil al objective Iife. will be
completely otTered up, given." Ufe/Silualions (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), p. 11.
29Hazel E. Bames, "Sartre and the Emotions." in Silnon Glynn, ed .• Sartre: An Invesligalion
01 Some Major Themes (Aldershot, England: Avebury. 1987), p. 83.
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As Sartre entered the final years of his life, he had begun to think about
an "ethics of we"30 that left behind individualism and was based on the idea
that human consciousnesses interpenetrate and constitute each other in a
primordial way. In the controversial interviews with Benny Uvy published just
before his death, Sartre made some preliminary remarks regarding an ethics
grounded in the idea of brotherhood rather than freedom. I do not accept the
eommon charge one hears from many Sartreansthat the only voice we hear in
these interviews is that of Benny Uvy performing Iike a ventriloquist with an
enfeebled Sartre. Rather I find it not only intriguing but totally consistent with
Sartre's character-if one may appeal to such an un-Sartrean category as
eharaeter-that Sartre invoked religious metaphors remin~scent ofboth prophetic
Judaism and primitive goddess worship in order to express the links of mutual
care that hold together all human beings.
Uvy's discussions had introduced Sartre to certain prophetic elements of
Judaism, especially its moral critique of the existing structures of society. The
prophets and their rabbinic successors retained ,a suspicion about established
political power. In the Jewish idea of the messianie age, moreover, Sartre could
see an approximation of his own vision for the advent of a new ethical existence
for human beings. As Uvy presented it to hirn, Jewish messianism also offered
a religious counterpart to Sartre's own ideas of "revolution." In its own way,
prophetic Judaism had anticipated much of Sartre's own demand for a
revolutionary break with the present state of society and a time when the
suffering and oppressed groups of this society would be liberated.31
Sartre realized that the utopian changes he envisioned would require social
relations to be based on a bond more basic than simply sharing the rights of
eitizenship and civil coexistence. He demanded a deeper bond, "the relationship
of brotherhood (fraternite). "32 As a model for this relationship, Sartre reached
back even further into religious history , and introduced a discussion of primitive
totemism. He suggested that what linked the members of primitive teibes in a
relationship of brotherhood was their identification with a common descent from
JO"J.P. Sartre & M. Sieard: Entrelien," Obliques, 1979, nos. 18-19, p.IS.
31 "Today.s Hope: Conversations wilh Sartre," Telos, Summer 1980, p. 179.
32"Today·s Hope," p. 170.
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the tribe's totem animal. Unlike Freud, who had also studied primitive
totemism, Sartre did not see the totem as a symbol of a dictatorial father.
Indeed, he rejected Uvy's suggestion to see brotherhood as the idea that we are
all sons of a single father, the mythic basis of the patriarchal religions of the
west. On the contrary, he believed the primordial sense of brotherhood or
kinship in primitive tribes is rooted in the idea of birth. To be members of the
same species is to share the same parents, to be bom of the same mother (or
totem animal) who engenders us all. To bring about a future recovery of the
sense of brotherhood will mean to reexperience this attachment through a
common mother, that is, to achieve a solidarity rooted in a sense of global
family.33
Jeanette Colombel notes that the posthumously published Cahiers pour une
Morale of Sartre see brotherhood as an ancient link between people, going back
thousands of years. It presupposes acceptance of othemess as the highest moral
value. In his conversations with her, Sartre often grappled with finding a
foundation for morality that was not based merely on a rational principle of
obligation.34 It was brotherhood that offered this foundation. Such
brotherhood, moreover, does not arise out the violent revolt of the oppressed,
but rather from the bond of tendemess linking mother and child. This was a
theme Sartre had explored at length in his work on Flaubert, wbere he wrote
". . . in order to love life, to wait each minute for the next with confidence,
with hope, one has to have been able to intemalize the Other9 s love as a
fundamental affirmation of the self. "35
3>tbis may be the next dialectical stage beyond the brotherhood based on the oath of violence
described in the Crilique 01 Dialeclical Reason, translated by Alan Sheridan-Smith (London: NLB,
1976). This earlier fonn of brotherhood arose out of a unified revolt against the oppressors who
refused to recognize one's humanity and who defined one as Other. Since revolutionary brothers
came together in a kind of oedipal revolt againsl the patemalistic power of society, it was not
surprising that Sartre saw the bonds belween them as totally self-generated. He wrole: ·We are
brothers insofar as, following the creative aet of the pledge, we are our own sons, our common
ereation.· (p. 431).
34Jeanette Colombel, Sal1re (Paris: Librairie Generale Fran~aise, 1985-6), vol. 2, pp. 739-43.
3S lhe Family Idiot, voJ. I, lranslaled by Carol Cosman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1981), p. 392.
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What Sartre seemed to be groping for in bis last interview was a symbolic
foundation for renewed human relationships that many feminist theologians have
rediscovered in the image of the Goddess. In saying trus, please note that I am
not ascribing any theolog;cal convers;on whatsoever to Sartre, but merely noting
the addition of a new religious melaphor to the long list of others he had used
throughout bis life. For many people attracted to this image, the goddess does
not represent a metaphysical entity "out there," but rather an alternative model
of relationsbip and connection to the parts of reality from which we have
become alienated by traditional hierarcbical, dualistic categories.36 With the
powerful image of a female totem like this, hUDWlity might begin to transcend
the divisions of self and other. Sartre explained:
All of us are brothen in thc clan ina.much a. wc are born of thc urne woman, who
is representcd by the tOlem. They Are aU brother. in the sense that all are born from
the womb of woman; and at that point the individualily of thc woman il not a
question. She is simply • woman, with the womb that will cngcndcr, thc brcaltl that
will nourish, the back that perhaps will carry.... When I sec a man, I think: hc has
the same origin as myself, Iike me he comes froln Mother Humanily, let's aay,
Mother Earth as Socrales says, or Mother....31
We can only speculate about the direction Sartre might have laken this idea. At
the time he spoke to Uvy, he thought he probably still had five to ten years left
to work out his new ideas about ethics. If Jewish messianism was a way to
imagine social and ethical progress in this world, then perhaps the mythic
goddess might have offered him a symbolic model with which to reclaim a more
matemal model of morality tbat values accepting, nourishing and supporting the
Otber, especially a weaker, dependent Otber. Most exciting about the image of
tbe engeodering mother goddess is its potential for helping to build a model of
cooperation between self and otber, ratber tban irreversible separation and
objectification. In The Second Sex, Beauvoir observed that meo are valued above
36Carol Christ, "Why Women Need thc Goddesl: Phenomenological, P.ychololical and Political
Reflections," in Carol Christ and Judith Plaskow, eds., Womanspiri' Ris;ng (New York: Harper and
Row, 1979), pp. 273-87.
31"Today's Hope; p. 171. In his War Diaries, translated by Quintin Hoare (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1984), Sartre had already considered, albcit somewhat crilically, the idea of
universal womb as the "final dialectical avalar of the idea of human specie•. " (p. 21)
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women because humans are raised above the animals not in giving Iife but in
risking it. In the end, Sartre was prepared to abandon sueh a model. His seareh
for eonnection with the Other had been hampered by a model of the self based,
at least in part, on the male experienee of separation from the original
attaehment to the mother, and transcendenee of one's origins. Sartre's
reconsideration of the eoneept of family as a model for human relations was
leading him to a new understanding of self and other, and the possibility of an
ethie rooted not only in the eollective struggle against oppression but also in the
primordial human experienee of being cared for. 38
Ironically, in the final discussions about the moral ehallenge of prophetie
Judaism and its protest against oppression, and the matemal earing implied in
the image of the Great Mother, Sartre was struggling to listen equally to at least
two ethieal voiees whose apparent eontradietion had brought his student to him
for adviee nearly forty years earlier.
Rutgers University STUART Z. CHARME
38Cf. Noddings, Caring: A Fenlinine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education.
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